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2009 Tabor Lecture
BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS:
ETHICAL DILEMMAS OF CORPORATE
COUNSEL IN THE WORLD OF THE HOLDER
MEMORANDUM
John Hasnas*
In Homer’s Odyssey, the Strait of Messina is beset by two fearsome
sea monsters. On one side resides Scylla, a creature with twelve feet and
six heads on long, snaky necks, each possessing three rows of razor
sharp teeth, who devours whatever comes within her reach. A bowshot
away on the other side, resides Charybdis, a creature who drinks down
and belches forth the waters of the strait three times a day, creating
whirlpools that are fatal to shipping. On his voyage home, Odysseus
attempts to sail through the narrow strait, avoiding both the slavering
jaws of Scylla and the whirlpools of Charybdis. He is unable to do so
successfully.
This Lecture suggests that in the contemporary legal environment,
corporate counsel as well as outside counsel who represent corporations1
frequently find themselves in a situation analogous to that of Odysseus.
The legal standard of corporate criminal liability coupled with current
federal law enforcement policy can force attorneys who represent
corporations to sail a vanishingly narrow strait between their
professional obligation to represent their clients zealously within the
bounds of the law and their personal moral obligations to deal with
corporate employees honestly and justly.
Professional ethics concerns both the ethical obligations of individual
actors within a system and the ethical quality of the system as a whole.
*
Associate Professor, McDonough School of Business, Georgetown University; J.D. &
Ph.D. in Philosophy, Duke University; LL.M in Legal Education, Temple University. The
Author wishes to thank the members of the Tabor Institute on Legal Ethics and the faculty
at the Valparaiso University School of Law for the opportunity to present the 2009 Bench
and Bar Lecture. The Author also wishes to thank Ann C. Tunstall of SciLucent, LLC, for
her insightful comments on a draft of this Lecture, and Annette and Ava Hasnas of the
Montessori School of Northern Virginia for providing him with first-hand experience of
what it means to be between Scylla and Charybdis.
1
For purposes of concision and convenience, I will employ the term “corporation” to
refer not merely to businesses that have gone through the formal process of incorporation,
but to business organizations generally, regardless of their legal form. My remarks apply
to counsel representing partnerships and other unincorporated business organizations as
well as those representing corporations.
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When the focus is on the behavior of individual professionals, the
inquiry addresses questions such as: What obligations do individual
attorneys, physicians, clergymen, accountants, etc. take on when they
assume their professional roles? What are and how do we determine the
contours of these obligations? How can we demonstrate that they are
genuine ethical obligations? When the focus is on the functioning of the
system as a whole, however, the inquiry addresses questions such as: If
all of the individual actors meet their professional obligations, will the
result be good for society as a whole? Does the system function in a way
that works an injustice or unreasonable hardship on any individuals or
on particular segments of the community?
The questions associated with these two lines of inquiry are distinct,
but related. If the system is ethically well-grounded, the individual
professionals can feel confident that they are “doing the right thing” in a
larger, societal sense by fulfilling their professional obligations under
their profession’s codes of ethics. On the other hand, if there are
questions about the ethical quality of the system as a whole, individual
professionals will be able to repose less trust in their profession’s codes
of ethics and will be more open to doubt about whether to adhere to
their professional obligations in difficult cases.
An ideal system is one in which the collective goals of the system
and the obligations and incentives of the individual professionals are
aligned. Such a system is one in which individual professionals advance
the well-being of society by meeting their professional obligations.
Unfortunately, in the context of corporate criminal responsibility, the
overarching goals of our adversarial system of justice and the obligations
of individual attorneys under the Canon of Ethics are not well-aligned.
This misalignment stands in sharp contrast to the situation that
ordinarily obtains. For, when attorneys represent individual clients, the
goals of our system of justice and the professional obligations of
individual attorneys are mutually reinforcing.
Under the Canon of Ethics, attorneys assume a fiduciary obligation
to their clients. They undertake to keep their clients’ communications
confidential2 and to zealously represent their clients’ interests3 to the
exclusion of the interests of both other individuals and society as a
whole. Attorneys may depart from this fiduciary relationship only in a
small and definitely identified class of exceptional cases.
It is easy to explain why individual attorneys are ethically bound to
act in accordance with these undertakings. The duty arises from each
attorney’s own freely given promise coupled with the basic ethical
2
3
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obligation to keep one’s word. Clients are willing to confide in their
attorneys and to pay them for their services because attorneys promise
confidentiality and fiduciary representation. For an attorney to make
such a promise, obtain information on the basis of the client’s reliance
upon it, and then use the information to serve any interest other than the
client’s would be the ethical equivalent of fraud.
Does requiring attorneys to maintain the obligations of
confidentiality and exclusive representation serve the interests of the
larger society as well? In an adversarial system of justice, when the
client is an individual, the answer is yes.
Law is concerned with interpersonal human conflict. Human beings
have both limited knowledge and limited ability to distance themselves
from their own goals. Hence, we are aware that we do not have access to
objective truth. As illustrated by the famous Akira Kurosawa movie,
Rashomon,4 we know that our perceptions of reality are affected by our
interests. The foundation of the adversarial system of justice is the belief
that letting each party tell his or her story to an impartial decision-maker
will get as close to the truth as is humanly possible. This belief is
justified, however, only if all parties are able to tell their story effectively.
This, in turn, implies that for the system to work, all parties to a legal
dispute need access to a skilled advocate who can make sure that their
side of the story is adequately presented. For such an advocate to be able
to perform his or her function effectively, the advocate needs the client’s
full confidence—the client’s willingness to relate all the details of the
case no matter how unfavorable, embarrassing, or threatening to the
client’s future interests they may be. Only one who undertakes a
fiduciary obligation to the client and guarantees to preserve the client’s
confidential communications can generate this level of confidence. Thus,
supplying each potential litigant with an expert representative who has
undertaken the obligations described in the Canon is necessary to make
the system function as designed.
The idea underlying an adversarial system of justice is that
individuals pursuing their own interests within a properly structured
system will produce the optimal outcome for society. The clash of wellrepresented opposing parties will burn away falsehood and biased
judgment to reveal the truth and produce a just result. This is an
invisible-hand mechanism. When the system properly aligns the
incentives of the litigants with the goals of justice, the individual
litigants, each thinking only of his or her own advantage, are led as if by
an invisible hand to produce just outcomes.
4
For those of us who do not like reading subtitles, the Hollywood-Paul Newman
version of the film, THE OUTRAGE (MGM (Warner) 1964), will do.
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The invisible hand is usually associated with Adam Smith’s
description of a market in The Wealth of Nations.5 Smith argued that
when individuals pursue self-interest within the incentives of a free,
competitive market, the common good is more effectively achieved than
it would be if each actor was striving to realize it him- or herself. The
reason for this is that the combination of the limitations on human
knowledge that make it impossible for us to take all consequences of our
actions into account and our ineradicable prejudices and partiality make
it difficult to achieve the common good directly. Precisely the same type
of argument undergirds our system of justice. The limitations on human
beings’ knowledge and impartiality means that we are more likely to
produce justice when we do not aim at it directly, but allow it to emerge
from a process that tends to cancel out errors and prejudices.
There are many grounds on which this argument for the adversarial
system may be criticized. Evaluating such criticisms would take us well
beyond the scope of this Lecture, however. For present purposes, I will
simply assert that, by and large, I believe the argument to be a good one,
and hence, I am supportive of an adversarial system of justice. Within
such a system, attorneys can feel confident that by adhering to their
professional obligations to their clients, they are also benefitting society
as a whole. And the importance of this confidence cannot be gainsaid.
For, it is crucially necessary to help attorneys weather the criticism and
scorn they receive when they represent unpopular clients.
My confidence that there is a proper alignment between the goal of
justice and the professional obligations of attorneys is limited to those
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 356 (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds., Liberty Classics 1981). Smith states:
As every individual, therefore, endeavours as much as he can both to
employ his capital in the support of domestick industry, and so to
direct that industry that its produce may be of the greatest value; every
individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of the
society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to
promote the publick interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it.
By preferring the support of domestick to that of foreign industry, he
intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a
manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his
own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible
hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it
always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing
his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more
effectually than when he really intends to promote it. I have never
known much good done by those who affected to trade for the publick
good. It is an affectation, indeed, not very common among merchants,
and very few words need be employed in dissuading them from it.
Id.
5
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cases in which the client is an individual, however. I am much less
sanguine about the situation when the client is a corporate entity. Under
present federal criminal law and law enforcement policy, an attorney
representing a corporation has reason to doubt whether the zealous
representation of his or her client really serves the ends of justice—
whether he or she is doing the right thing by adhering to his or her
professional obligation. This doubt does not arise from any flaw
inherent in the adversarial system of justice, but from perverse incentives
introduced into the justice system by a misguided Supreme Court
decision and the actions of our present Attorney General during his
previous tenure with the Department of Justice.
The misguided Supreme Court decision is the 1909 case of New York
Central & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States.6 In that case, the Court
held that corporations could be criminally convicted for the crimes of
their employees under a respondeat superior theory of liability. This
means that a corporation is guilty of the crimes committed by any of its
employees acting within the scope of their employment for the benefit of
the corporation.
Why do I call this decision misguided? Consider the following. If
corporate employees violate the criminal law while working within the
scope of their employment, they may be prosecuted as individuals. This
is perfectly sensible. Working within a corporation does not insulate one
from the consequences of his or her wrongdoing. Under New York
Central, if corporate employees violate the criminal law while working
within the scope of their employment, their corporation may be
prosecuted as well. Why?
The justification for respondeat superior liability in tort is not
available. Employees are often judgment-proof, and hence cannot be
deterred from engaging in risky activity that they believe will earn them
rewards from their employer by the threat of civil liability. Respondeat
superior tort liability creates an incentive for employers to deter such
conduct by their employees. But this justification does not apply in the
criminal context because no employee is criminally “judgment-proof.”
All are subject to the threat of criminal punishment for criminal activity.
Further, in New York Central, the Court itself recognized that the
justification for respondeat superior tort liability is the need to do
corrective justice. The Court stated that such liability
is not imputed because the principal actually
participates in the malice or fraud, but because the act is
done for the benefit of the principal, while the agent is
6

212 U.S. 481 (1909).
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acting within the scope of his employment in the
business of the principal, and “justice requires that the
latter shall be held responsible for damages to the individual
who has suffered by such conduct.”7
Indeed, it is a commonplace in tort that corrective justice may require
one who is without personal fault but who has caused or benefitted from
an injury to an innocent party to pay compensation to restore the injured
party to his or her previous condition. But this is irrelevant to criminal
liability in which corrective justice is not at issue. What is needed in the
context of the criminal law is a justification for punishment, not
restitution.
Ethicists often grapple with the question of whether corporations as
opposed to individuals can be held morally responsible for actions.
Many argue that they cannot.8 Some argue that they can.9 Among the
latter, some argue that corporations are morally responsible for
corporate policy—for the output of the corporation’s internal decision
structure.10 Others contend that corporations are morally responsible for
the actions of their employees when they maintain a corporate culture
that encourages wrongdoing.11 But none have argued that corporations
are morally responsible for the crimes of their employees when they
have done everything in their power to prevent such wrongdoing and
maintain an ethical corporate culture.
Id. at 493 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., JOHN R. DANLEY, Corporate Moral Agency: The Case for Anthropological Bigotry,
in BUSINESS ETHICS 202 (W. Michael Hoffman & Jennifer Mills Moore eds., 2d ed. 1990);
JOHN LADD, Persons and Responsibility: Ethical Concepts and Impertinent Analyses, in SHAME,
RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE CORPORATION 77 (Hugh Curtler ed., 1986); Michael Keely,
Organizations as Non-persons, 15 J. VALUE INQUIRY 149 (1979); Larry May, Vicarious Agency
and Corporate Responsibility, 43 PHIL. STUD. 69 (1983); Manuel Velasquez, Debunking
Corporate Moral Responsibility, 13 BUS. ETHICS Q. 531 (2003).
9
See THOMAS DONALDSON, CORPORATIONS AND MORALITY 30 (Prentice-Hall 1982);
PATRICIA H. WERHANE, PERSONS, RIGHTS, AND CORPORATIONS 59 (Prentice-Hall 1985);
Peter A. French, The Corporation as a Moral Person, 16 AM. PHIL. Q. 207, 211 (1979); Michael J.
Phillips, Corporate Moral Personhood and Three Conceptions of the Corporation, 2 BUS. ETHICS Q.
435, 453 (1992).. See also David T. Ozar, The Moral Responsibility of Corporations, in ETHICAL
ISSUES IN BUSINESS: A PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH 294 (Thomas Donaldson & Patricia
Werhane eds., 1979); Kenneth E. Goodpaster & John B. Mathews, Jr., Can a Corporation Have
a Conscience? 60 HARV. BUS. REV. 132, 135 (1982); Robert J. Rafalko, Corporate Punishment: A
Proposal, 8 J. BUS. ETHICS 917, 924 (1989).
10
See French, supra note 9, at 211.
11
See, e.g., Pamela Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal
Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1103–05 (1991); Ann Foerschler, Corporate Criminal Intent:
Toward a Better Understanding of Corporate Misconduct, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1287, 1287–88 (1990);
Jennifer Moore, Corporate Culpability Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 34 ARIZ. L. REV.
743, 767–73 (1992).
7
8
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Yet, the respondeat superior liability authorized by New York Central
holds corporations criminally liable for the actions of their employees
taken within the scope of their employment no matter what. Under New
York Central, the corporation is liable even if the employee’s conduct is
against corporate policy and contravenes the employee’s explicit
instructions.12 Under New York Central, the corporation is liable even if
the corporation has the most pristine corporate culture and has
undertaken the most vigorous efforts to prevent employee wrongdoing.
Under New York Central, the corporation is strictly liable for the crimes of
its employees.
But New York Central is not misguided merely as a matter of moral
responsibility. The decision also cannot be justified as a matter of
criminal responsibility. The purpose of the criminal law is punishment.
But vicarious corporate criminal liability serves none of the purposes of
punishment.
To see why, please note that corporations are subject only to
financial sanctions. Because corporations have no bodies, they cannot be
incarcerated. They may be fined, which constitutes the direct application
of a financial penalty. They may have licenses revoked or otherwise
have their freedom to transact business restricted, but such measures
merely constitute the indirect application of a financial penalty—they are
punitive only to the extent that they reduce the corporation’s
profitability. They may be liquidated, which can be thought of as a
corporate death sentence. But because corporations are not literally
living things, any “execution” is entirely metaphorical. Liquidation is to
be feared only because of the financial losses that result from it.
Who pays when a financial loss is imposed upon a corporation? To
the extent that such a loss cannot be passed along to consumers, it is the
owners of the corporation, the shareholders, who incur the penalty. The
defining characteristic of modern corporation is the separation of
ownership and control. The shareholders, who own the corporation,
have no direct control over or knowledge of the behavior of the
corporate employees who commit criminal offenses. Hence, inflicting
punishment on a corporation’s shareholders is punishing those who are
personally innocent of wrongdoing for the offenses of others.13 How can
12
New York Central & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493 (1909);
United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 1972).
13
My arguments are intended to apply to business organizations generally, not merely
to those that have undergone the formal process of incorporation. Hence, with regard to
incorporated business organizations, this point must be adapted to the relevant
organizational form. For example, in the case of limited partnerships, the issue would
concern punishing the firm’s innocent limited partners rather than innocent shareholders.
In this regard, it must be admitted that in those business organizations in which there is
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punishing the innocent advance any of the legitimate purposes of
punishment?
It cannot. Consider retribution first. Retribution justifies imposing
sanctions only on those who have acted in a blameworthy way.
Retribution clearly justifies punishing corporate employees who commit
a criminal offense. It cannot justify punishing corporate shareholders
who are innocent of personal wrongdoing. A criminal justice system
based exclusively on a retributivist theory of punishment would
expressly exclude such vicarious criminal liability.
What about deterrence? All but the staunchest retributivists would
argue that a major purpose of criminal punishment is to deter
wrongdoing. But not by any means. Specifically, not by punishing the
innocent. In the Anglo-American criminal justice system, deterrence
refers to inflicting punishment on a wrongdoer to discourage others from
committing similar offenses. It does not refer to punishing the innocent
to pressure them into suppressing the criminal activity of their fellow
citizens.
There is a sense in which threatening to inflict punishment on a
corporation’s innocent owners for the crimes of the corporation’s
employees can be said to deter crime. Fear of the financial penalty to be
visited on the corporation can motivate management to attempt to
suppress criminal activity by corporate employees. But this form of
deterrence is no different in principle from more venial and obviously
unacceptable forms of punishment. Much of the crime attributable to
teenagers could undoubtedly be deterred by punishing parents for their
children’s offenses. The Nazis sought to deter acts of resistance by
punishing innocent members of the communities in which such acts
occurred. Although such measures may be effective, they generally are
not and should not be permitted in a liberal criminal justice system.
Threatening innocent shareholders with punishment for the offenses of
culpable corporate employees may be an effective means of reducing
criminal activity within business organizations, but it does not constitute
the type of deterrence that can justify criminal punishment in a liberal
legal regime.
Punishment is sometimes justified on the basis of its rehabilitative
effect. But rehabilitation refers to imposing treatment on a wrongdoer
designed to reform his or her character to ensure better behavior in the
future. One cannot rehabilitate the innocent. Threatening those who
true shared control among all parties—e.g., certain general partnerships—there may be no
question of punishing the innocent because all parties are personally culpable. However,
in such cases, punishing the firm as a corporate entity would be pointless because all
members of the firm would be subject to conviction as individuals.
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have not engaged in wrongful conduct with punishment in order to
make them “behave better” is not rehabilitation. It is coercing them to
act in the way that the coercive agent believes that they should.
“Rehabilitating” the innocent is simply depriving them of their liberty.
There is no doubt that the threat of corporate criminal liability can
influence managers to adopt legal compliance programs and to
otherwise try to produce a corporate environment that discourages
criminal activity by its employees. But such governmental action is not
rehabilitation, and as a matter of principle, it is not distinct from the
practices of the old Soviet Union and Mao’s China in which those whose
conduct was unacceptable to the government were sent to psychiatric
hospitals and “re-education” camps. Threatening innocent shareholders
with punishment for the offenses of culpable corporate employees may
be an effective means of producing a general improvement in “corporate
culture,” but it is not a form of rehabilitation that can justify criminal
punishment in a liberal legal regime.
Now, consider the practical effect of the New York Central standard of
corporate criminal liability. Under New York Central’s respondeat
superior liability, there is nothing a corporation can do to ensure that it is
not guilty of a criminal offense. Corporate counsel know that no matter
how good their firm’s internal controls, they cannot guarantee either that
there will be no intentional violations of law by rogue employees or that,
in today’s highly-regulated business environment where many offenses
do not require intentional conduct, there will be no inadvertent
violations of law. Corporate counsel also know that because under the
New York Central standard the corporation’s good behavior is no defense,
the corporation can be convicted whenever such violations occur.
Further, as illustrated by the fate of Arthur Andersen, criminal
indictment can be a corporate death sentence. Any company dependent
upon its reputation for honest dealing or government contracting from
which it can be debarred must avoid indictment at all costs. Therefore,
the financial health and frequently the continued existence of the
corporation can rest on whether the corporation is indicted.
This brings us to the second element of the problem—the policy of
the Department of Justice (DOJ) governing the criminal indictment of
corporations. This policy is contained in a memorandum originally
drafted by Attorney General Eric Holder when he was Deputy Attorney
General during the Clinton Administration.14 It has been revised and

14
See Memorandum from Deputy Att’y Gen. Eric H. Holder, Jr., to Heads of Dep’t
Components & United States Att’ys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations
(June 16, 1999).
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reissued several times being called respectively, the Holder, Thompson,15
McNulty,16 and Filip Memorandum.17 Now that Attorney General
Holder has returned to the DOJ, I will refer to the memorandum by its
original designation as the Holder Memorandum.
The Holder
Memorandum lists the factors prosecutors are instructed to consider in
deciding whether to indict a corporation. These factors include whether
the corporation has an effective compliance program18 and whether the
corporation cooperates with the investigation of its employees’
wrongdoing.19
What makes a compliance program an effective one? It must be
“adequately designed for maximum effectiveness in preventing and
detecting wrongdoing by employees,” a characteristic that depends in
part on seriousness of the program’s “disciplinary action against past
violators” and the “promptness of any disclosure of wrongdoing to the
government.”20
What constitutes cooperation? As recently as three years ago,
cooperation was defined in terms of “the corporation’s willingness to
identify the culprits within the corporation, including senior executives;
to make witnesses available; to disclose the complete results of its
internal investigation; and to waive attorney-client and work product
protection,”21 and its refusal to support employees under investigation
“either through the advancing of attorneys fees, through retaining the
employees without sanction for their misconduct, or through providing
information to the employees about the government’s investigation
15
Memorandum from Deputy Att’y Gen. Larry Thompson, to Heads of Dep’t
Components & United States Att’ys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations
(Jan. 20, 2003) [herein after Thompson Memo].
16
Memorandum from Deputy Att’y Gen. Paul J. McNulty, to Heads of Dep’t
Components & United .States Att’ys Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations
(Dec. 16, 2006) available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.
pdf.
17
Memorandum from Deputy Att’y Gen. Mark R. Filip, to Heads of Dep’t Components
& United States Att’ys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Aug. 28,
2008) available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/readingroom/dag-memo-08282008.pdf
[hereinafter Filip Memo].
18
The memorandum instructs prosecutors to consider “the existence and effectiveness
of the corporation’s pre-existing compliance program” and “the corporation’s remedial
actions, including any efforts to implement an effective corporate compliance program or
to improve an existing one[.]” Id. at 4.
19
The Memorandum instructs prosecutors to consider “the corporation’s timely and
voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the investigation of
its agents,” and “to replace responsible management, to discipline or terminate
wrongdoers, to pay restitution, and to cooperate with the relevant government agencies.”
Id.
20
Id. at 15.
21
Thompson Memo, supra note 15, at 5.
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pursuant to a joint defense agreement.”22 However, due to the uproar
over forced waivers of attorney-client and work product privilege and a
finding that coercing a corporation into refusing to pay its employees’
attorney’s fees constituted a violation of the Sixth Amendment,23 the DOJ
now defines cooperation as “the corporation’s willingness to provide
relevant information and evidence and identify relevant actors within
and outside the corporation, including senior executives.”24 This
includes turning over the factual results of all internal investigations and
a refusal to aid suspected employees in mounting a defense.
The effect of the New York Central standard of corporate liability
coupled with incentives in the Holder Memorandum is to place
corporations and their employees in an adversarial relationship. As
should be apparent from the way the DOJ defines compliance programs
and cooperation, the only way for a corporation to reduce its prospects
of being indicted when an employee comes under investigation for
possible criminal activity is to sign on as a deputy prosecutorial agent.
This state of affairs creates a considerable divergence between what is
good for the corporation and what is good for its employees.
Let’s consider several examples, beginning with the question of
employee privacy. Do employees have any right to privacy in the
workplace? They certainly do not possess anything like the right to
privacy they have in their own homes. Employers are entitled to
monitor employees’ conduct in the workplace to ensure they are capable
of doing their jobs and are in fact doing them. It is reasonable to believe
that employees waive their right to privacy with regard to employmentrelated matters when they enter into the employment relationship.
However, merely accepting employment does not give employers carte
blanche to investigate non-job-related aspects of their employees’ lives.
Doing so not only violates employees’ residual right to privacy, but, to
the extent that the employees are aware that their activities may be
monitored at all times, creates an oppressive working environment.
To reduce its chances of being indicted should employees come
under investigation, a corporation must have an effective compliance
program that is “adequately designed for maximum effectiveness in
preventing and detecting wrongdoing by employees . . . .”25 Yet, white
collar crime almost always consists of crimes of deception. Such crimes
are necessarily designed to be indistinguishable from legal behavior.
What level of monitoring would be required for the corporation’s
22
23
24
25

Id. at 6 (footnote omitted).
See United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008).
Filip Memo, supra note 17, at 7.
Id. at 15.
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compliance program to be maximally effective in preventing and
detecting such disguised wrongdoing? By necessity, the level of
monitoring would have to be more intrusive than that required merely
to monitor job performance. How much more intrusive? There is no
clear answer to this question, but recent developments may provide
some insight. For example, Deloitte and Touche LLP markets a service
preparing psychological profiles of employees to aid corporations in
detecting those more likely to commit fraud,26 and Wal-Mart has hired
former FBI, CIA, and DOJ officials to conduct internal investigations of
its employees.27 Such developments suggest that meeting the DOJ’s
definition of an effective compliance program is largely incompatible
with maintaining proper respect for employees’ right to privacy.
Next, consider the question of confidentiality. To run an ethical
business, mangers have to know what is going on in the firm. Most
businesses attempt to acquire information of potential wrongdoing by
promising employees who come forward confidentiality. Such promises
of confidentiality usually come in one of two forms. First, corporations
create confidential lines of communication that circumvent the ordinary
corporate chain of command, such as employee hotlines or
organizational ombudsmen. Second, corporations encourage their
employees to provide information to corporate counsel under the
protection of the attorney-client privilege. But what happens when these
confidential channels generate information that suggests possible
criminal activity within the firm? In order to reduce its risk of corporate
indictment, the corporation must cooperate with government
investigations. Cooperation requires the corporation to provide the
government with “the facts known to the corporation about the putative
criminal misconduct under review.”28 Although since 2008, the DOJ will
no longer request waiver of attorney-client or work-product privilege,29
it still requires corporations to disclose the facts generated by the
corporation’s internal investigations, whether made to corporate counsel,
employee hotline, or corporate ombudsman. As a result, the corporation
must choose between protecting itself against indictment and honoring
its promise of confidentiality.
One might assume that an ethical corporation can avoid this
dilemma by refusing to make promises of confidentiality that it knows it

26
See Karen Richardson, Find the Bad Employee: A Tool Can Do It, Privacy Issues Aside,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2006, at C3.
27
See Michael Barbaro, Bare-Knuckle Enforcement for Wal-Mart’s Rules, N.Y. TIMES, March
29, 2007, at A1.
28
Filip Memo, supra note 17, at 9.
29
Id.
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will later have to breach. But that will not work. The maintenance of a
confidential mechanism for reporting possible criminal conduct is the
hallmark of an effective compliance program.30 Failure to promise
confidentiality essentially guarantees that a corporation’s compliance
program will not be considered an effective one. Hence, corporations
have the strongest possible incentives to both make and breach promises
of confidentiality.
Now consider the question of organizational justice. Do corporations
have any ethical obligations to support their employees who come under
suspicion of criminal wrongdoing? Perhaps not, if they know that their
employees knowingly and intentionally violated the law. But what if the
corporation does not know this? Don’t loyal employees who come
under suspicion have some claim to fair treatment by their employer?
Aren’t they entitled to a minimal presumption of innocence in the sense
that no adverse action be taken against them in the absence of adequate
evidence of wrongdoing? But to be considered cooperative by the DOJ,
corporations must essentially sign on as deputy prosecutors. Helping
those employees, who the DOJ considers culpable, to mount a defense;
refusing to sanction employees who elect not to speak to prosecutors;
providing employees with information about what the government is
investigating; and entering into joint defense agreements with employees
that may disable the corporation from “providing some relevant facts to
the government”31 may all be regarded by the DOJ as “limiting [the
corporation’s] ability to seek . . . cooperation credit.”32
How can
managers afford their employees even a modicum of due process while
threatening them with termination if they refuse to cooperate with
prosecutors and doing everything in their power to aid in their
prosecution? Given the DOJ’s definition of cooperation, corporations’
best chances of avoiding indictment directly conflict with any duty they
may have to protect their employees against potentially ungrounded
criminal accusations.
The poster child for this problem is the recent KPMG LLP case.
Between 1996 and 2003, KPMG marketed several tax shelters designed to
allow wealthy investors to avoid federal taxes. In July, 2001, the Internal
Revenue Service “listed” two of these tax shelters, putting taxpayers on
notice that the IRS considers them suspect and subject to challenge in tax

30
Indeed, in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress required publicly traded companies to
establish procedures for “the confidential, anonymous submission by employees of the
issuer of concerns regarding questionable accounting or auditing matters.” Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 776 (2002) (emphasis added).
31
Filip Memo, supra note 17, at 13.
32
Id.
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court. The IRS did not, in fact, challenge any of KPMG’s shelters in
court. Hence, whether the shelters are legal or not has never been
officially determined. In 2003, Congress began an investigation of
potentially abusive tax shelters including those marketed by KPMG.
KPMG defended the marketing of its shelters before Congress, sending
one of its partners to testify as to their legality. Subsequently, the DOJ
opened a criminal investigation into KPMG’s marketing of the shelters.
In response to the DOJ investigation, KPMG took the following
measures. It agreed not to assert any legal privilege including its
attorney-client and work product privileges and to disclose all
information in its possession regarding the actions of its present and
former partners, agents, and employees that the government deemed
relevant. It agreed to identify any witnesses that may have information
relevant to the investigation and to use its best efforts to induce its
present and former partners and employees to provide information and
testimony to the government. It refused to advance the legal fees of any
partner or employee who refused to cooperate with federal
investigators.33 It refused to enter into any joint defense agreements with
any of its present or former partners or employees. It agreed to inform
the government which documents its partners and employees were
requesting to prepare their defenses. It refused to inform its partners
and employees of the documents it was supplying to the government to
aid in their prosecution. It placed on leave, reassigned, or forced the
resignation of many of its tax partners. It officially stated that a number
of its tax partners engaged in unlawful fraudulent conduct and agreed
not to make any statement, in litigation or otherwise, that is inconsistent
with that assertion or to retain any employee who makes such a
statement.34 And it agreed to pay a $456,000,000 fine.35 KPMG took

33
This was in conformity with the provision in the Thompson Memorandum (the
predecessor of the McNulty and Filip Memoranda) that permitted prosecutors to consider
the payment of such fees as a lack of cooperation. The currently operative Filip
memorandum does not permit such consideration.
34
The latter had the practical effect of threatening any KPMG employ who testifies for
the defendants with termination, significantly undermining the defendants’ ability to
mount a defense.
35
The facts of this account of the KPMG case are taken from David N. Kelley, U.S.
Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Deferred Prosecution Agreement (Re:
KPMG) (Aug. 26, 2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/
August05/kpmgdpagmt.pdf; Press Release, Internal Revenue Service, KPMG to Pay $456
Million for Criminal Violations (Aug. 29, 2005), available at http://www.irs.gov/
newsroom/article/0,,id=146999,00.html; Laurie P. Cohen, In the Crossfire: Prosecutor’s
Tough New Tactics Turn Firms Against Employees, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2004, at A1; Editorial,
KPMG in Wonderland, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 2005, at A14; Leonard Post, Deferred Prosecution
Deal Raises Objections, NAT’L. L. J., Jan. 30, 2006 at 4.
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these measures to avoid the type of federal indictment that destroyed
Arthur Andersen, LLP.36
In this context, consider the professional obligations of attorneys
representing corporate clients. Corporate counsel have a fiduciary duty
to their client to zealously pursue its legal interests in preference to all
others. But their client is the corporation. Therefore, they are obligated
to do what is in the best interest of the corporate entity. In the context of
criminal investigations, what is in the best interest of the corporation is,
to use the current idiom, “to throw the employees under the bus.”
Lawrence Thompson, who as Deputy Attorney General reissued the
Holder Memorandum as the Thompson Memorandum, is now general
counsel of PepsiCo. In a manner perfectly consistent with his authorship
of the Thompson Memorandum, Thompson recently stated that to fulfill
his duty to zealously represent his corporate client when it becomes the
subject of a federal criminal investigation, his job would be to get the
government off PepsiCo’s back as quickly and efficiently as possible—
which means cooperating fully with prosecutors as a means to
terminating the investigation.37
Now recall the questions that we must ask ourselves to evaluate the
ethical quality of the adversarial system of justice as a whole. The first
was: If all of the individual actors meet their obligations, will the result
be good for society as a whole? In the case of attorneys representing
corporations, there is no reason to believe this will be the case. The
justification for maintaining a fiduciary relationship between attorneys
and their clients was that in an adversarial system of justice, truth is best
discovered by sifting the clashing accounts of opposing parties. But the
New York Central standard of liability coupled with DOJ enforcement
policy incentivizes corporations to be deputy prosecutorial agents. In
effect, corporations are punished for presenting an account of events at
odds with the prosecution’s, and rewarded for actions that make it more
difficult for their individual employees to air their side of the story by
putting on a defense. In circumstances in which the best interests of the
corporation lies in suppressing rather than presenting an adversarial

36
Most of the indictments of KPMG employees were ultimately dismissed as entailing
violations of the defendants’ Fifth and Sixth Amendments rights. See United States v. Stein,
541 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008). The Stein decision is chiefly responsible for the DOJ dropping
the requirements that corporations waive attorney-client privilege and refrain from
advancing employees’ attorney’s fees to be considered cooperative in the 2006 McNulty
and 2008 Filip Memoranda.
37
Lawrence Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen., Remarks at a Round Table Discussion at
The Heritage Foundation, Following His Address on The Future of the Attorney-Client
Relationship in White-Collar Prosecutions (Nov. 30, 2006).
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viewpoint, the fiduciary relationship to the client does not advance the
truth-finding and justice-seeking goals of the justice system.
The second question was: does the system function in a way that
works an injustice or unreasonable hardship on any individuals or on
particular segments of the community? In the case of attorneys
representing corporations, there is good reason to believe the answer to
this question is yes. If attorneys representing corporations act as
Lawrence Thompson recommends, there will be considerable injustice
and hardship on any corporate employee suspected of a crime—think of
the situation of a potentially innocent employee in KPMG’s tax
department—and if compliance programs are oppressive enough,
perhaps on employees in general.
The answers to these two questions suggest that there is a
considerable misalignment between the professional obligations of
attorneys representing corporations and the overarching goals of the
justice system. As long as the incentives created by the New York Central
standard of corporate criminal liability and the Holder Memorandum
are operating, attorneys representing corporations who act in accordance
with their professional obligations are not necessarily serving the
interests of justice. With these perverse incentives in place, the invisible
hand built into our system of justice will lead us astray.
Conversely, when attorneys representing corporations perceive that
they are not necessarily “doing the right thing” in the larger, societal
sense by conforming their behavior to their professional standards and
code of ethics, their commitment to fulfilling their professional
obligations will wane. Not all attorneys who represent corporations are
as sanguine about the actions they are called on to perform as is
Lawrence Thompson. Many feel highly conflicted about sacrificing the
interests of the corporation’s employees to protect the corporate client.
Corporate counsel frequently describe the personal anguish involved in
giving the “Upjohn warning.”38 This is the statement they make to
corporate employees before interviewing them, informing them that
anything the employees communicate is protected by attorney-client
privilege, and noting that the client is the corporation. In giving this
ethically required warning, corporate counsel know that most employees
do not understand that they are being told that the corporation will
reveal whatever the employees communicate whenever it is in the
corporation’s interest to do so, no matter how damaging it may be to the
employees. But to give the employees more than the ethically required
38
The name is derived from the case of Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), in
which the Supreme Court held that corporations are entitled to the protection of the
attorney-client privilege.
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notification—to explain that only the corporation and not the employees is
protected by the attorney-client privilege—would dry up the sources of
information corporate counsel need to protect the corporation’s interests.
And it is the corporation’s interests that corporate counsel are obligated
to zealously pursue.
Having identified the problem, I’m afraid I have no solutions to offer
to attorneys who represent corporations. The ideal solution would be to
eliminate vicarious corporate criminal liability. Doing so would instantly
resolve the misalignment. However, this would require either a
Supreme Court decision reversing a century-old precedent that serves as
the basis of modern corporate criminal law enforcement or an Act of
Congress that would be publicly perceived as going soft on corporate
criminals. Neither of these constitutes a likely scenario. Another
solution would be for Attorney General Holder to have an epiphany and
change DOJ policy on corporate indictment to one focused on a
corporation’s efforts to maintain an ethical corporate culture rather than
its efforts to help convict its own employees. But given that the metric
by which success is measured at the DOJ is one’s conviction rate, this is
probably equally unlikely to happen.
In the absence of such radical reforms, attorneys who represent
corporations are caught in a difficult situation. They are bound by their
oaths to zealously represent their corporate clients. Yet in doing so, they
may often be called on to treat the individual employees of the
corporation unjustly and retard the effectiveness of the adversarial
system of justice as a whole. Confronted with the task of navigating
between violating their professional obligations on the one hand and
being responsible for the unjust treatment of corporate employees on the
other, attorneys who represent corporations may be well able to identify
with Odysseus as he entered the Strait of Messina. Odysseus was unable
to navigate the Strait unscathed. Apparently, neither can attorneys
representing corporations.
Under such circumstances, what can an ethical attorney do? I’m
afraid that I have nothing to offer to such an attorney other than, “the
best you can.”
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